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In Hollywood, the appearance of power is itself power.' This
Hobbesian view2 is derived in part from the nature of the business; as the
adage states, you are only as good as your last film.3 Industry
decisionmakers often base employment decisions and financial
compensation for creative talent-actors, directors, writers-on the talent's
previous body of work, especially the most recent film project on which the
talent has performed. While some individuals can transcend a failed project
and remain powerful enough to command top jobs with the accompanying
top salaries,4 the situation of the screenwriter is generally distinctly
different. The screenwriter is most often perceived as essentially
dispensable within the industry in relation to the other significant creative
elements, such as the director and actors. Such lack of status pervades how
I See 1 THOMAs D. SELTZ FE AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND
Busrnqss PRACTICES § 6.04, at 6-15 to 6-16 (2d ed. Clark Boardman Callaghan 1996)
(1992) (discussing application of this principle to film distributors).
2 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 62 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1991) (1651) ("Reputation of Power, is Power....").
3 See WILUAM FROUG, ZEN AND THE ART OF SCREENWRrING 265-266 (1996).
4 Actor Sylvester Stallone provides a prime example. Stallone entered into the
ranks of a leading man with 1976's Rocky, for which he reportedly received only the
then-industry minimum for his acting, $20 thousand for the screenplay and an
unexpectedly lucrative 10% of the film's profits. See EDWARD GROSS, ROCKY AND THE
FILMS OF SYLvESTER STALLONE 13 (Hal Schuster & Bob Garsson eds., 1990).
Following the success of Rocky, Stallone starred in F.LS.T. and Paradise Alley, two
box office failures, before making the successful Rocky IL. Another failure, Victory,
followed, bringing Stallone's track record for lead roles in mainstream films to two hits
out of five films. Nevertheless, he was paid ten million dollars for Rocky IlL See
WILuAM GOLDMAN, ADvENTUREs IN THE SCREEN TRADE 26 (1983). More than a
decade later, Stallone's domestic allure has waned, resulting in his having had few
domestic hits in the last five years, but his salary is now $20 million per picture, thanks
in part to his strong international draw. See Beth Laski, Meyer Makes Noise with $60
Mil Stallone Pact, VARETY, Aug. 14, 1995, at 5, 12.
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a screenwriter is treated, as accolades for a successful project rarely attach
to the screenwriter. 5 Yet, in an industry in which jobs depend upon an
individual's track record, the existence of any track record may be viewed
as preferable to having no official screenwriting credits to one's name. 6
Herein lies the issue of interest to parties concerned with methods of
alternative dispute resolution. For the screenwriter, receiving credit for
having written for a film is not always a certainty, and is indeed often
improbable, given that only a limited number of writers may receive
credit.7 It is not uncommon for a multitude of professional screenwriters to
work on a single screenplay, rewriting one another's work in an effort to
create a script that the film's producers, director, actors (if they have
enough clout) and the studio bankrolling the project will all find
acceptable.8 When the time comes for determining who receives credit for
the completed script, disagreements often arise, and when no agreement
can be reached as to whose name should appear on the silver screen, it is in
the interest of the industry to quickly resolve the problem. The movie must
make its release date, and waiting for the often extended wheels of
litigation to turn may prove disastrous. As a result, the industry has turned
toward a quicker means of resolving the question of who receives credit-
who establishes another line on his or her resume, which, if the film is a
success, may mean significant future writing opportunities and paychecks-
5 See HAROLD ORENsTEIN & DAvID E. GUINN, ENTERTAINMENT LAW & BUSINESS:
A GUIDE TO THE LAW AND BusIEss PRACTICES OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY,
§ 9.5, at 9-17 ("[C]redit for a successful film is most often given to the director, its
stars, or the producer rather than its writer.").
6 See discussion infra Part II.B.
7 The Writers Guild of America, Inc. (WGA), the screenwriters' union, has
entered into an agreement with Hollywood's creative community which provides that
only up to three screenwriters may receive "Screenplay by" credit, no matter how many
authors contributed to a script. For a discussion of the basic credits which may jbe given
and their related requirements, see infra Part 1I.C.
8 See Benjamin Svetkey, Who Killed the Hollywood Screenplay?, ENT. WKLY.,
Oct. 4, 1996, at 32, 36-37. Most films, regardless of what the credits read, have been
worked on by numerous writers. For example, Eraser and The Rock each had seven
screenwriters. See id. The Flintstones is attributed to at least 32, see id., with as many
as 35 writers who made contributions. See "Flintstones" Scripters Locked Out,
VARmTY, Jan. 31, 1994, at 8. The use of multiple screenwriters is nothing new; Gone
With the Wind is the work of 16 scribes. See STEPHEN F. BREIMER, CLAUSE BY CLAUSE:




and who receives no credit, with the accompanying lack of related
dividends. The industry has embraced the use of arbitration. 9
Yet, the method of arbitration employed in determining screenwriting
credits differs substantially from the more traditional method of arbitration.
During screenwriting credit determinations, the identity of the arbitration
panel members responsible for reaching a decision is always kept secret,
even from one another; the decision reached by the panel is not explained,
as no explicit reasons are given to the screenwriters. Further, the
decisionmaking process, while highly structured procedurally, is arguably
guided by relatively open-ended substantive standards where the
unexplained personal judgment and preferences of the arbiters is regarded
as sufficient. The complaint is that the system is unfair, sacrificing a degree
of justice by meeting the industry's need for speed. At stake are
reputations, livelihoods, fairness and literally millions of dollars.
The purpose of this Note is to describe the unusual manner in which
arbitration is employed within this aspect of the film industry, where, as in
many areas of commerce, lengthy litigation would disrupt corporate
strategy, damage individual worker's career development and potentially
impact revenue to such a degree that the result would be the failure of
business enterprises altogether. Part II of this Note sets forth the necessary
context for appreciating the nature of the film industry and the often
precarious financial stability confronting industry players, and also explains
the status and function of the screenwriter and the significant role credits
play in shaping future work allocation and income. In Part III, the credits
determination process adopted by the industry is examined in detail, and in
Part IV, the most prominent legal challenges that have been brought against
this method of arbitration are discussed, with attention paid to some of the
precedents' impact on implementing comparable methods of arbitration in
various fields, both similar and dissimilar to the film industry. Part V
examines how well the credits arbitration procedures satisfy the advantages
9 It should be noted that credits arbitration is not the industry's exclusive area in
which alternative dispute resolution is employed; in fact, arbitration is pervasive within
Hollywood, preferred over litigation by industry players, as "almost every collective
bargaining agreement contains some form of arbitration mechanism." 2 SELTZ ET AL.,
supra note 1, § 21.17, at 21-49. For several commendable overviews of the use of
arbitration in resolving disputes in Hollywood, see id. at 21-49 to 21-73; Richard L.
Feller, Let Me Count The Ways-Dispute Resolution in the Entertainment Industry, 4
ENT. & SPORTS LAw. 1 (1985). See also Melvin Simesky, The Importance of
Arbitration in Entertainment Industry Dispute Resolution (pts. 1-3), N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1,
1985, at 6, Mar. 8, 1985, at 5, Mar. 15, 1985, at 5.
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to be found in the traditional arbitration model. Finally, Part VI presents
some general conclusions of interest to individuals involved in structuring
methods of dispute resolution, which demand quick resolution and possible
concealment of party identity.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. The Nature of the Film Industry
The motion picture industry, all artistic considerations aside, is big
business masquerading behind the facade of an entertaining and socially
conscious spectacle. In 1996, domestic box office revenue reached $5.92
billion, an all-time high, and ticket sales reached its largest volume in
thirty-seven years with an estimated 1.35 billion admissions sold.' 0
Additionally, international markets have become an increasingly prominent
source of revenue, with studios now thinking globally in making
production, marketing and casting decisions.11 Film is the United States'
second leading positive export; the industry created a $3.5 billion trade
surplus in 1993.12
Yet, despite the large numbers, the film industry is built upon a
precarious foundation. The nature of the industry has been an increasing
movement toward production of instant hits; although a record number of
movie theaters exist, exhibitors who display motion pictures in their
theaters are increasingly reluctant to continue showing a film unless it is a
clear blockbuster. 13 Studios are quite cognizant of the fact that if a film
10 See Brian Fuson, Speeding Tickets Fuel B.O., Tim HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 2,
1997, at 1. Domestic box office revenue includes the United States and Canada. See id.
at 39.
11 See DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND THE BusINEsS OF TH
ENTERTAn MENT INDusTREs 6 (3d ed. 1996). "American film, television, record, and
music publishing companies now derive more than half their revenues from foreign
markets ... and must therefore consider the tastes of consumers in other countries as
much as those of U.S. consumers." Id.
12 See Karen L. Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution and the Need for Disclosure:
A Study of Incentives in the Motion Picture Industry, 27 CONN. L. REv. 53, 55 n.2
(1994) (citing Hearings on H.R. 3051 Before the Subcommn. on Intellectual Property and
Judicial Administration of the House Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong. 186 (1992)
(statement of Daniel Jaffee, Committee for America's Copyright Community)).




does not open well-if it does not enjoy a lucrative first weekend-it is
likely to be quickly forgotten as the-public and industry turn their attention
to the next potential hit. 14 One industry analyst has estimated that out of ten
motion pictures, seven will fail to recoup production costs, two will attain
the break-even point and only a single film will actually produce a profit. 15
The hit films must yield enough revenue to enable a studio to endure
numerous failures while concurrently investing capital into the development
of new, promising features. 16 Coupled with effectively satisfying the
constant demand for high-yielding products are pragmatic concerns:
escalating budgets, increasing marketing costs 17 and potential loss of
revenue in payout to creative talent with enough clout to demand a
percentage of the ticket sales.18
The costs associated with motion picture production are staggering.
Many films are the end result of development, in which a film studio's
development funds are used to hire a screenwriter to draft a script for a
potential motion picture. 19 Estimates have placed the number of films in
development as between ten and twenty times the number of films actually
produced, with a large percentage of these development deals never
resulting in a produced film-meaning that the money expended on a failed
project's development is lost.20 Such development must continue, though,
given the huge investment and high risk atmosphere; a steady flow of
14 See 1 SELTz Er AL., supra note 1, § 2.06, at 2-18 (citing Hollie, Hollywood
Strategy for Summer Films, N.Y. TIMs, June 26, 1981, at D1, D4).
15 See id. (citing Fox Re-States Vow Vs Anti-Bid States, VARIETY, May 6, 1982, at
6, 28).
16 See id. § 3.04, at 3-22 to 3-23.
17 See Stephen Galloway, Stirred by Boxoffice, but Shaken, THE HOLLYWOOD
REP., Jan. 8, 1997, at 1, 50.
18 See 1 SEL"Z ET AL., supra note 1, § 2.06, at 2-18.
One entertainment industry commentator observed: "[E]ven with huge grosses, the
deals given top talent make it difficult for the studios to show healthy profits. In
[the film] Hook, for example, director Steven Spielberg and stars Dustin Hoffman,
Julia Roberts, and Robin Williams are reportedly receiving a total of 40 percent of
Tri-Star's first $50 million earned by the studio."
Id. (citing Soocher, Film Industry Faces Historic Crossroad; Across-the-Board
Changes, ENT. L. & FIN., Jan. 1992, at 1.
19 See 1 ERIC B. YELDELL, THE MOTION PICTURE AND TELEVISION BusNEss:
CONTRACTS AND PRACTICES § 1.04, at 1-7 (2d ed. 1987).
20 See 1 SELTZ ET AL., supra note 1, § 2.06, at 2-19.
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multiple projects allocates risk and increases the possibility of releasing a
high-yielding product. 21 Other benefits also accrue:
A steady product flow increases a company's chance for survival for
several reasons: a steady product flow makes it easier to cover fixed
overhead costs; a steady product flow gives the source of that flow more
leverage in the marketplace; and a steady product flow leads to increased
acceptance by retailers and consumers of other projects from the source.22
Should a film achieve actual production, budget costs can easily exceed
initial allocations, thus creating a costly drain on financial resources. 23 The
average cost of producing films that do remain within their given budgets
has continued to rise, resulting in immense aggregate filmmaking costs. 24
Often, the results are less than rewarding. For example, although a record
number thirteen films reached true domestic "blockbuster" status in 1996,25
a larger number of expensive motion pictures performed poorly. 26 New
pictures with potential blockbuster capacity must be in the development
21 See id. § 3.04, at 3-20.
22 1d. § 3.06, at 3-35.
23 See id. § 2.06, at 2-19. One of the more infamous examples of spiraling budget
costs is the 1980 film Heaven's Gate, which initially had a projected budget of $7.5
million. The final cost of the film eventually exceeded $40 million. See id. (citing Film
"Heaven's Gate" Taken Off Market, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1980, at C24). A more
recent disappointment was the Arnold Schwarzenegger vehicle Last Action Hero,
initially budgeted at $45 million, with the final budget an estimated $82 million. See id.
at 2-20 (citing Seigel, Sputtering Box-Office Action Grounding $82 Million 'Hero,'
CHICAGO TRm., July 16, 1993, § 3, at 1).24 See 1 SELTZ ET AL., supra note 1, § 2.08, at 2-3 to 2-4.
25 See Fuson, supra note 10, at 39. Blockbuster status is achieved by a film
grossing $100 million or more domestically; the 13 films produced an estimated box
office take of $1.9 billion. See id.
26 For example, New Line Cinema financed the action-adventure picture The Long
Kiss Goodnight for reportedly around $70 million, expended another $25 million in
marketing costs and saw a domestic gross of $33.1 million in return. See Bad Timing
for New Line Troubles, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 8, 1997, at 56. That same year
New Line experienced similar disappointments with the Marlon Brando film The Island
of Dr. Moreau ($50 million budget, $28 million box office) and Last Man Standing,
starring Bruce Willis ($57 million budget, $18.1 million gross). See id. Wall Street
estimates of New Line's value decreased from $1.2 billion to $800 million during 1996.
See id. Such box office results are hardly unique to New Line, as a comparative study
of the major industry players would reveal essentially similar results.
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process, ready to be released to attempt to pick up where another one or
two-or dozen-other films have failed.
The motion picture industry, then, is almost paradoxical in its
character. It is a spectacle, entertaining and provoking and sometimes
illuminating, and it is big business, where commercial failure is
commonplace and the need for the next big hit drives the industry practices
and concerns. Constant product is needed to survive, and failure to release
multiple films with the potential for high box office returns on a regular
basis could ultimately mean the demise of the studio or production
company funding a project. From this demand for continual product grows
the overwhelming need for quick resolutions to disputes that disrupt the
precarious balancing in which industry players find themselves involved;
for both larger industry players and independent companies alike, extended
litigation could consume valuable time. Failure to place a potential hit film
in the theater could easily mean the loss of the opportunity to place another
film into exhibition-whether due to irreparable financial ruin or loss of
leverage and credibility. 27
Coupled with this need to resolve disputes quickly is the desire to
resolve them in a way that preserves relationships. The entertainment
industry in general "is a relatively small business with only a handful of
companies that have sufficient financing to back entertainment projects, and
only a relatively few people with the special spark of creativity to produce
the blockbusters on which the industry depends." 28 As a result, the
likelihood that parties to a dispute will encounter one another again in the
27 "For example, due to a lack of steady product flow, independent movie
producers have an increasingly difficult time in getting theaters to exhibit their films and
in obtaining foreign distributors to distribute their movies." 1 SELTZ Er AL., supra note
1, § 3.06, at 3-36 (citing Murphy, US Independents Down, VARIETY, June 13, 1979, at
18). While the situation for independent producers has arguably improved in recent
times, some analysts believe that there is an oversaturation of independent films on the
market, causing smaller independents difficulty in securing and retaining exhibition on
screens and creating pressure to produce a larger gross early on for all distributors. See
Joseph Steuer, The Indies: Too Much of a Good Thing, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 9,
1997, at 1, 54.
28 1 SELrz FT AL., supra note 1, § 7.06, at 7-11. The entertainment industry
encompasses the film industry. There is an increasing trend toward attaining synergy
among the various facets of the larger entertainment industry, with the emergence of
corporate giants whose interests cross over into film, television, live theater, music and
print publishing. See generally 1 SELTz Er AL., supra note 1, at ch. 1, 3.
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course of their respective careers is high.29 The relatively closed nature of
the film industry creates a disincentive to alienate others who may
experience a subsequent rapid rise in power; the need to resolve disputes is
balanced against the need to retain ongoing relationships.
B. The Screenwriter and the Importance of Credits
There are two basic ways in which a screenwriter receives work. The
more prominent method is to accept writing assignments, in which the
screenwriter will work with a studio or production company (or both) to
develop a script from a story idea; the idea need not originate with the
writer. In addition, a screenwriter may be brought in to rewrite another
writer's script entirely, or to "polish" various story elements, such as
dialogue or plot.30 Such practices, termed script doctoring, can be
especially lucrative; it is not uncommon for top screenwriters to doctor a
script for anywhere from $150,000 to $200,000 per week31-with no
expectation of ever receiving credit on screen. 32
The second method of writing for film involves the screenwriter
producing a "spec script"-a script written on speculation, with no
guarantee of making a sale. 33 Sales of spec scripts often receive increased
attention both in and outside the industry, with formerly unknown writers
who had never made a sale suddenly receiving hundreds of thousands of
dollars-sometimes more-for spec scripts. 34 Such success has been
compared to winning a screenwriting lottery,35 but the prospects of making
29 See id. § 7.06, at 7-11.
30 See BROOKE A. WHARTON, THE WRrTER GOT SCREWED (BUT DIDN'T HAVE To)
137 (1996).
31 See Dan Cox & Ted Johnson, ARB Imbroglio Roils Writers, VARIETY, Dec. 4,
1995, at 7.
32 See infra Part III. Screenwriter Jonathan Lemkin, for example, polished story
elements on the Sylvester Stallone film Demolition Man, but received no credit. See
John Brodie, Spec Script Lotto Leaves Some Pic Scribes Blotto, VARmTY, July 18,
1994, at 15.
33 See WHARTON, supra note 30, at 137. For example, A-list screenwriter Shane
Black sold his spec script to New Line Cinema for $4 million, see Paul F. Young,
Hollywood Squeezing Scripters, VARiETY, April 17, 1995, at 50, yet the results were
disappointing. See supra note 26.





such a sale36 and of sustaining a career after the initial sale37 do not lie in
the writer's favor.
Ultimately, both methods of writing for motion pictures often depend
upon one thing, credits. Amid the Hollywood atmosphere of continual risky
investment and pursuit of successful material, the screenwriter occupies an
interesting position. The screenwriter is the beginning of the filmmaking
process, serving an integral function that is wholly indispensable. 38
However, "[w]riters hold a unique position in the motion picture and
television industries-a position of both respect and disdain .... The status
of writers in the metaphoric Hollywood is merely that of another employee
of the producer." 39 This apparent dichotomy is an outgrowth of the
paradoxical nature of the industry, where while everyone wants to produce
the next successful script, everyone also wants to avoid failure-or perhaps
more specifically, the industry decisionmakers want to avoid the
appearance of fault. Consequently, it is not uncommon for screenwriters to
be routinely closed off from the fimmaking process after the script has
been delivered and any contractually-required opportunities for rewriting
have been allowed by the producer, 4° or to be shut out of consideration for
writing assignments altogether due to a lack of perceived status41-status
derived not necessarily from talent, but from credits received on past
36 Competition among spec writers is fierce. The Writers Guild of America
provides a registration service through which professional and aspiring screenwriters
may register material such as scripts; in 1988, the year in which the collective
bargaining agreement cited in this Note was implemented, there were over 40,000
scripts registered-and not even 120 films were produced. See SYD FIELD, SELLING A
SCREENPLAY: THE SCREENWRITER'S GUIDE TO HOLLYWOOD 5 (1989).
37 See Brodie, supra note 32, at 9.
38 See FIELD, supra note 36, at xv.
39 ORENSTEIN & GUINN, supra note 5, § 9.5, at 9-16 to 9-17; see also BREMER,
supra note 8, at 1 ("Since the inception of the film business, studios have considered the
screenwriter a disposable employee. Hired help.") (emphasis in original).
40 See ORENsr & GUINN, supra note 5, § 9.5, at 9-17. ("[S]creenwriters retain
little or no control over their work. Even in situations in which the writer creates an
original scenario, it is sold to a producer outright, and the producer reserves the
absolute right to alter, change, or rewrite the scenario as he or she may elect."); see
also FROUG, supra note 3, at 263-266; Gulick, supra note 12, at 117 n.67 (citing
Goldman, The Screenwriter, in THE MoviE BusINEss BooK 59 (Jason E. Squire ed.,
1983); MARK LrrwAK, REEL POWER 174-176 (1986)).
41 For a fuller exploration of this concern, see the remaining discussion infra Part
II.B.
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financially successful films. 42 Such credit has been defined by one
screenwriter as "the lifeblood of everyone in this industry" 43 due to its
potential impact upon a screenwriter's career "screen credit is probably the
single most important factor for artists in the entertainment business....
[t]his factor determines who is "hot" and who is not; it is the basis for
determining whether artists are offered subsequent assignments and their
increase in compensation for those assignments. "44
The desire to avoid failure by looking to credits in making executive
decisions has helped contribute to an industry mentality emphasizing "hot"
screenwriters over lesser known scribes: "Whether it's to lure a star or to
cover themselves in case of a flop, many studio execs today are more
comfortable paying a 'name' screenwriter $1 million to write a draft than
hiring a seasoned but less glitzy veteran scribe for less than half that
amount." 45 This mentality
42 Yet, even possessing credit on financially unsuccessful projects is better than
having no credits at all:
Even if the project as a whole is a failure . . .[receiving credit] for the venture is
important for those people whose contributions have been favorably received....
[T]he recognition value of billing increases even for the credit recipients whose
contributions have been unfavorably received. . . . [The mere fact that a venture
has been produced, or a person employed, at all is helpful in obtaining further
work opportunities.
1 SELTZ ET AL., supra note 1, § 9.05, at 9-10.
43 Cox & Johnson, supra note 31, at 14.
44 Robert Davenport, Screen Credit in the Entertainment Industry, 10 Loy. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 129, 129 (1990). The WGA 1996 Screen Credits Manual reflects this belief,
stating that "[a] writer's position in the motion picture or television industry is
determined largely by his/her credits. His/her salary status depends on the quality and
number of the screenplays, teleplays, or stories which bear his/her name." Writers
Guild of America SCREEN CREDrrs MANUAL (1996 revision) at i [hereinafter WGA
MANUAL]; see also 1 SELTZ ET AL., supra note 1, § 9.05, at 9-20 to 9-22 (discussing
how credits may be used: to obtain a job, to negotiate a higher salary, to possess the
leverage to pick and choose jobs and to obtain contingent compensation); YELDELL,
supra note 19, § 14.02 (A), at 14-9. Courts have routinely recognized the value of
screenwriting credit, see 1 SELTz ET AL., supra note 1, at 9-7 to 9-8, with one court
stating that "[a] writer's reputation, which would be greatly enhanced by public credit
for authorship of an outstanding picture, is his stock in trade." Id. at 9-8 (quoting Poe
v. Michael Todd Co., 151 F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)).
45 Young, supra note 33, at 1.
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reflects the paranoia felt by studio executives who don't read much
themselves, or who fear rocking the corporate boat.... [A] producer
with a studio deal explains, "[The executives] think an expensive writer
will get it right the first time. And if he doesn't, the executive has
protected himself by using a pre-approved writer."'46
The pre-approved writer mentality has resulted in an inordinate amount
of work allocated to those screenwriters perceived as hot writers within the
industry, an estimated thirty or so individuals. 47 While some studios
actually circulate a list of acceptable hot writers for writing assignments,
other studios require their executives to commit the roster to memory. 48
The result of such a credit-based, hit-based mentality has had a
significant economic impact upon the screenwriting community. In 1995,
the screen and television writers' union, the Writers Guild of America, Inc.
(WGA), reported record earnings of $535.8 million by its members, with
the top fifty screenwriters providing for approximately one-half of 1995's
income growth. The WGA has 11,000 members, 49 a membership which
grew by an estimated one to two screen or television writers joining per
day,5 0 of which approximately 1680 screenwriters were employed in
1995.51 Yet, only the top one percent of employed writers enjoyed the
46 Id. at 50.
One of the town's top agents offers similar insights. "For some reason, a
whole crop of new execs sprang up in the '90s who had no historical knowledge of
the business, and they would only hire who they thought would do it right. And




49 See I SELTZ ET AL., supra note 1, § 1.07, at ls-1 (May Supp. 1997). The actual
number of WGA members with "active" status, however, is 7,825 writers. See 1997
WGA REPORT TO WRrrERS at 9 [hereinafter WGA REPORT].
50 'Me figure for 1995 has been given variously as 346 members joining, see Ted
Johnson, WGA: Top Scribes Hit Earnings Jackpot, VARiETY, Jan. 8-14, 1996, at 18,
and as 520 members joining. See Steve Schlich, Writer's News, CREATIVE
SCREENwR=G, Summer 1996, at 119, 121. The Writers Guild places the number at
504. See 1997 WGA REPORT, supra note 49, at 10.
51 See Johnson, supra note 50, at 18. It must be noted that the figures in the
preceding discussion are estimates, as the 1997 WGA Report to Writers contains several
similar, but conflicting, numbers. For example, the WGA reports that in 1995, 1667
screenwriters were employed with their combined earnings totaling $310.5 million of
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extremely lucrative six to seven figure paydays, as the median income of a
Guild member was a lesser $62,000.52 In addition to the up-front payment
for drafting a script, credit on a film can produce other fiscally rewarding
dividends depending upon contractual negotiations: residual payments,
royalty payments, percentage of profit participation in gross receipts and
percentage participation in film-related products. 53 Credits, then, determine
perceived status within the industry, which in turn determine future work
allocation and income. As a result, competition for credit has become
increasingly important, and disputes requiring resolution have become
commonplace, with between twenty-five to thirty percent of all films
brought before the WGA resulting in Guild-conducted arbitration designed
to quickly and efficiently determine to whom credit is due.54
III. THE WGA CREDITS DETERMINATION PROCESS55
A. The Road to Arbitration
In an effort to minimize delays in releasing films, the film industry
routinely employs arbitration in place of extended, resource-consuming
litigation. 56 Many business relationships in Hollywood are governed by
collective bargaining agreements that establish minimum terms of
employment and provide for use of arbitration, as main creative talents
such as producers, directors, actors and writers are represented in the
the $582.8 million earned under WGA contracts. See 1997 WGA REPORT, supra note
49, at 8. The numbers for 1996 show an increase in all categories, with 1735 employed
screenwriters earning a total of $352.1 million of a total $652.6 million earned under
WGA contracts. See id.
52 See Schlich, supra note 50, at 121.
53 See Steven E. de Souza, Movie Credits as the Writers' Tombstone: Screen Ain't
Big Enough for All of Them, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 1990, at M4. Participation in film-
related merchandise can be especialy lucrative; in one of the more successful, albeit
extraordinary examples, licensed merchandise from the Star Wars trilogy of films has
generated $4 billion in sales. See Steve Daly, The Remaking of Star Wars, ENT. WKLY.,
Jan. 10, 1997, at 18, 22.
54 See Cox & Johnson, supra note 31, at 14.
55 All references to the WGA collective bargaining agreement are by necessity to
the 1988 Minimum Basic Agreement (extended in 1992); as of this writing, the most
current agreement has not yet been published by the WGA.




aggregate by job-specific unions. 57 Of particular interest here is the WGA's
Minimum Basic Agreement, which governs the determination of valuable
screen credit and provides for Guild arbitration to diffuse potentially
disruptive delays arising from credit disputes.
Originally, screenwriting credit was often beyond the reach of the
screenwriter. Although many screenwriters received credit for their
contributions, other writers saw their efforts degraded as studio executives
or producers gave either partial or full writing credit to their secretaries,
relatives and even bookies58 and mistresses. 59 Other screenwriters were
unable to receive credit due to Hollywood blacklisting in the era of
McCarthyism. 60 Through negotiations, the WGA assumed responsibility for
determining screen credits in 194161 so that all Guild signatories-those
studios and production companies that have entered into contracts
incorporating the WGA collective bargaining agreement-have agreed to
give only the specific type of approved credits in the particular manner set
forth by the Guild. 62 Several characteristics define the WGA credit
determination process: "(1) only specified writing credits may be awarded,
(2) credits will be awarded based upon the contributions of the writers
involved, (3) in no event may more than a few writers share a writing
credit, and (4) the WGA is the final arbiter of who is to be awarded writing
credit. "63
As provided in schedule A of the WGA Minimum Basic Agreement,
initial responsibility for determining credit lies with the signatory
production company producing the film. The signatory production
company, after weighing the respective contributions of all participating
57 See 1 SELTZETAL., supra note 1, § 1.07, at 1-24 to 1-28.
58 See Robert Eisele, Arbitration is the Way to Go, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1996, at
F3.
59 See de Souza, supra note 53, at M4.
60 See, e.g., Terry Pristin, Mending "Broken Arrow": Writers Guild Considers
Award for Blacklisted Screenwriter of 1950 Film, L.A. TIMEs, June 29, 1991, at Fl.
61 See Eisele, supra note 58, at F3.
62 The 1988 WGA Basic Agreement provides in relevant part that "[t]he
[production] Company agrees that credits for screen authorship shall be given only
pursuant to the terms of and in the manner prescribed in the applicable schedule A..
. ." WRrrER'S GUILD OF AMERICA 1988 THEATRICAL AND TELEvISION BASIC
AGREEM ENT, art. 8, at 36 [hereinafter 1988 WGA AGREEMENT].
63 YELDELL, supra note 19, at 14-9.
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writers64 involved with a project, must send notification of tentative credits
to the writers or a writer's agent if so designated by the writer. The WGA
will also receive such notification, in addition to a copy of the final
shooting script or the most revised script available. 65 Upon receipt of the
company's proposed credits, a participating writer who is in agreement
need not respond, as failure to file a proper protest will be regarded as
agreement or acquiescence. Before agreement or disagreement is
expressed, a participating writer may discuss the proposed credits with
other writers on the project. After reading the final script or most available
revised screenplay, should a participating writer disagree with the tentative
credits, she must notify in writing both the production company and the
WGA within the time period specified on the proposed credits notice
(which cannot be less than called for in the collective bargaining
agreement). 66 Once the Guild has received official notification of protest,
several pre-arbitration procedures may ensue. 67
64 Who constitutes a participating writer eligible to participate in the determination
of writing credits includes:
[Any writer who has participated in the writing of the screenplay or teleplay, or
any writer employed by the company on the story, or any writer who sold or
licensed literary material subject to WGA Agreement on which the screenplay or
teleplay is based, or if the applicable picture is a remake, any writer who received
story, screenplay, or teleplay credit under a WGA Agreement on the prior version
of the picture.
YELDELL, supra note 19, at 14-14 n.24; see also 1988 WGA AGREEMENT, supra note
62, at 276-315; WGA MANuAL, supra note 44, at 3.
65 See WGA MANuAL, supra note 44, at 3. See also YELDELL, supra note 19, at
14-14.
66 See WGA MANuAL, supra note 44, at 4. See also YELDELL, supra note 19, at
14-14. The telegram (or fax) must read: "Have read final script and hereby protest
tentative credits on (name of production) and consider credit should be." WGA
MANUAL, supra note 44, at 4.
67 The Guild itself may also instigate arbitration under a number of circumstances.
The WGA reserves the right to commence arbitration on behalf of a screenwriter who
has declined to review or protest credits "on the grounds that a credit, like a minimum
wage, is an economic matter for all writers." WGA MANuAL, supra note 44, at 15.
Such protest may be commenced even if the screenwriter in question opposes the Guild
action. See id. Further, credit arbitration has been deemed mandatory by the Guild
whenever a production executive-a writing director or a writing producer-seeks
writing credit, unless the executive is the exclusive writer on the project. See id. at 13-




Prior to commencement of arbitration, which by Guild rules must be
limited to no more than twenty-one business days time from the initial
protest to the eventual decision, 68 all participating writers involved with a
film project may meet and collectively decide among themselves who
should receive writing credit and in what form the credit should be stated.
The meeting may be organized by any participating writer or may be
arranged by the Credit Arbitration Secretary if it appears there is the
possibility of resolution. Should agreement be achieved, it must be
unanimous and the agreed-upon form of credit must correspond to the
approved forms provided in Schedule A of the WGA Minimum Basic
Agreement. 69 Such determinations have resolved disputes without
proceeding into actual arbitration.70 Should no resolution be attained,
however, the dispute will proceed to arbitration.
When necessary, WGA procedures provide for a three-member special
committee drawn from the ranks of those sitting on the Screen Credits
Committee to conduct a pre-arbitration evidentiary hearing. At the hearing,
the committee will resolve through binding determinations any disputes
over the material to be submitted for arbitration; the participating
screenwriters may attend and present testimony and documentary evidence
writing credit. While participating writers may normally unanimously agree on credit
determinations prior to arbitration, in this instance "the participating writers may not
make a binding agreement as to the credit to be awarded, and the WGA will be deemed
to have made a written request for arbitration at the time the production company
submits the notice of the tentative writing credits." YELDELL, supra note 19, at 14-14.
68 See WGA MANUAL, supra note 44, at 6. In the case of emergencies, a
production company may request expedited action in which a decision will be rendered
within 10 days; even more condensed timetables may be considered if warranted. See
1988 WGA AGREEMENT, supra note 62, at 285.
69 See WGA MANUAL, supra note 44, at 4. However, the WGA may issue a
waiver permitting forms of credit not provided for in its Screen Credits Manual. See id.
at 13.
70 See de Souza, supra note 53, at M4. One screenwriter has claimed-perhaps
facetiously, given the importance of credits-that credit determinations have been
resolved by the flip of a coin. See id.
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in an effort to establish "the authenticity, identification, sequence,
authorship or completeness of any literary material to be considered." 71
Finally, before a credit dispute is submitted to arbitration, writers may
exercise their last right to withdraw their names from the project for
personal cause, whether based on principle or due to perceived mutilation
of their work. Should other writers on the project dispute the withdrawal,
the matter shall enter into arbitration to determine if personal cause exists.
Such withdrawal from screenplay credit must occur prior to arbitration,
however, as post-arbitration credits are held irrevocably binding. 72
C. Arbitration Structure and Procedures
Upon the need for actual arbitration, the WGA Screen Credits Manual
provides that the Credit Arbitration Secretary shall assemble a three-person
arbitration committee. All parties to the forthcoming arbitration are
provided with a screen arbiters list containing the names of those
individuals who may be selected as arbiters; ideally, the candidates will
have previously written in the genre of the current film undergoing
arbitration. As in voir dire, each arbitration party may peremptorily
challenge a reasonable number of potential arbiters; unlike voir dire, no
communication with the pool of potential decisionmakers occurs.73 The
remaining pool of potential arbiters enables the Credit Arbitration Secretary
to select three arbiters, at least two of whom shall have been WGA
members for two or more years and shall have served on a minimum of
two credit arbitration committees during that time. The final arbiter may
have similar experience or may be selected from the larger Guild
membership, provided the individual has been a Guild member for five or
more years or has received three screenplay credits. 74
The selected arbiters shall remain anonymous to one another because
the committee members perform their arbitary functions without inter-
committee communication or deliberation. Under Guild policy, the identity
of the arbiters is not disclosed to the participating writers seeking credit or
to any other Guild member, with the exception of the Credit Arbitration
71 WGA MANUAL, supra note 44, at 7. See also Cox & Johnson, supra note 31, at
14.
72 See WGA MANUAL, supra note 44, at 15.




Secretary and an appointed Credits Committee Consultant. The consultant,
whose identity is similarly undisclosed, functions as an aid to the arbiters,
providing necessary information on Guild "policy, rules, precedent and
procedure." 75 Confidentiality considerations also allow any participating
writer to request anonymity for all writers during the course of the
arbitration, resulting in assignment of generic identification labels (Writer
A, Writer B) determined by which writer preceded another chronologically
in producing work on the project under consideration. Upon request, the
title of the film may also remain undisclosed to the arbiters,76 although in
an industry in which the details of high-profile projects are rarely kept truly
secret, 77 this latter grant of anonymity may arguably be regarded as more
perfunctory symbolism than substantive protection.
The selected arbiters are then provided with the necessary material
from which a credit determination can be made. Such material should have
been previously examined by the participating writers seeking credit and
may have been the subject of an earlier hearing to resolve disputes or
confusion over the material.78 The material includes: (1) the production
company's tentative writing credits; (2) optional written statements by the
participating writers, which may include illustrative comparisons between
scripts and are not disclosed to the arbitration participants; (3) a statement
of the issue .to be resolved; (4) written material such as scripts and
treatments from the production company by all writers whose work was
used or might have been used by other subsequent writers, including source
material and a chronological statement listing the material; (5) other
relevant information requested by the WGA from the production company;
(6) the WGA Screen Credits Manual; and (7) a request for telephonic
75 Id. Interpretation of the rules and procedures of the WGA credits arbitration
process remains subject to revision as needed, as exemplified in the Credits Manual
disclaimer that "[t]he Guild has discovered that there is no such thing as binding
precedent. New conditions, new problems, new methods of work frequently require an
alteration of the rules." Id. at 17.
76 See id. at 5.
77 Hollywood is notorious for its lack of secrecy:
"Hollywood" is basically a very small community, and there are precious few
secrets. When a studio gives a green light to a project, before casting or crew is
completed, a lot of people know the project well: Remember that a majority of
films have been turned down already by the majority of studios.
GOLDMAN, supra note 4, at 80-81.
78 See WGA MANuAL, supra note 44, at 5; see also discussion supra Part III.B.
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indication of the arbiter's decision, to be followed by written
confirmation. 79
The arbiters then proceed to evaluate the material independently and
issue their decision. Here, the arbitration process is potentially subject
more to the personal inclinations of the arbiters than to rigid governing
rules; the Guild provides guidelines for awarding specific credits, but
arbiter interpretation of the creative process is substantial, and to a large
extent, unavoidable. One screenwriter who has been both arbiter and
participating writer describes this stage as "like measuring smoke."80
The determination of credits is based upon a holistic interpretation of a
screenwriter's percentage of contribution, with the type of credit to be
awarded dictating what percentage a writer must have brought to the final
script. However, the estimated percentage of contribution is not based upon
volume of pages or lines contributed; the arbiters are instructed to consider
a writer's impact upon "story, plot, structure, theme, characterization,
atmosphere, dialogue and the tone of the script." 8' Alteration of every line
of a script may not suffice if no substantive change has been made, while
alteration of a single part of a script may so dramatically constitute
significant contribution that credit will be awarded. 82 The number of
writers who may receive credit and the types of credits that may be
awarded are limited, the rationale being that "[flewer names and fewer
types of credit enhance the value of all credits and the dignity of all
writers."'8 3 The specific types of credit, despite their apparent clarity, may
not be easily understood by a layperson, as they depend upon Guild-
approved definitions. 84 For instance, the Screen Credits Manual explains
79 See WGA MANUAL, supra note 44, at 7. The written statement of a screenwriter
who desires to have input into the determination must be submitted to the WGA within
24 hours of notification that the tentative credits are subject to protest. See id. at 6.
80 Cox & Johnson, supra note 31, at 14. The screenwriter, Steven de Souza,
echoes the WGA's description of the arbitration as "arduous and unpleasant," WGA
MANUAL, supra note 44, at i, in his description: "It's a pain-in-the-ass job. Sometimes
they come to your door with a wheelbarrow full of scripts. You presume that [the
arbiters] do read them all." Cox & Johnson, supra note 31, at 14.
81 Cox & Johnson, supra note 31, at 14; see also WGA MANUAL, supra note 44,
at 12.
82 See WGA MANUAL, supra note 44, at 12.
83 Id. at 13.
84 One arbiter has written that comprehension of the various credits' distinctions
"is only a little simpler than following recent political events in Eastern Europe." de
Souza, supra note 53, at M4.
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that "[t]he term 'story' ... has a specialized legal meaning. It refers only
to writing that represents a contribution 'distinct from screenplay and
consisting of basic narrative, idea, theme or outline indicating character
development and action.'"85 This differs from "source material" which is
held to consist of "all material upon which the screenplay is based other
than story" such as plays, novels or purchased stories and articles that
provide a basis for the screenplay. 86
In general, the "Screenplay by" credit may be given to no more than
two individual writers, with the exceptions that (1) arbitration may allow
for a third writer to be added under unique circumstances and (2) up to two
writing teams, in which two writers work as a unit, may receive such
"Screenplay by" credit. 87 The necessary percentage required for
"Screenplay by" credit varies depending upon the origin of the script; an
original script requires that a subsequent writer or writing team contribute
fifty percent, whereas a script that was not developed from the original
writer's own idea requires that a subsequent writer seeking credit must
have contributed at least thirty-three percent to the screenplay. 88 Other
credits define other types of contributions tied to the origins of the
screenplay: "Written by" for when no source material exists and the writer
or team is responsible for both story and screenplay; 89 "Story by" for when
the writer has provided the story using no source material;90 "Screen Story
by"-awarded only through arbitration-for when a writer uses source
material only to create "a substantially new and different story"; 91 and the
less favored "Adaptation by" credit for when, through arbitration, it is
determined that a writer's contribution is significant in shaping a screenplay
85 WGA MANUAL, supra note 44, at 10.
86 Id. at 11.
87 See id.
88 See id. at 12.
89 See id. at 10.
90 See id. This credit may grow especially complex when source material is indeed
involved:
When the screenplay is based upon source material whose acquisition is not
covered by this Basic Agreement, screen credit for story authorship shall not be
given in the form "Story by" but may be given by the Company to the source
material author and may be worded "From a Story by" or "Based on a Story by"
or other appropriate wording indicating the form in which it is acquired.
Id.
9 1 Id. at 11.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
without qualifying for the aforementioned "Screenplay by" credit.92
Increased percentages and demands govern the award of writing credit to
production executives. 93
Upon weighing the requirements for each possible credit against every
involved writer's estimated contributions, each arbiter will arrive at a
statement of credits that he or she will communicate to the Credit
Arbitration Secretary, first by telephone, then by letter. After receiving the
written confirmation, the Secretary will notify the production company and
participating writers of the majority-rules credits decision, moving the
process into the final phase. 94
D. Post-Arbitration Procedures
Following the arbiters' credit determination, any participating writer
may appeal to the WGA Policy Review Board, which consists of the Chair
or Vice-Chair of the Credits Committee and two other Credits Committee
members. 95 Appeal must be taken within twenty-four hours of notification
of the arbitration decision, or the right to appeal is waived. 96 The function
of the Policy Review Board is not to consider the merits of a participating
writer's demand for credit; rather, the Board is solely concerned with
determining "whether or not, in the course of the credit determination,
there has been any serious deviation from the policy of the Guild or the
procedure as set forth in [the Screen Credits] Manual." 97 The material
considered by the arbiters will not be read, and the Board may not reverse
a determination or award credits itself; it may only either direct
reconsideration of the awarded credits by the original arbiters or call for a
new committee of arbiters to render a decision. Such extraordinary relief
will only be granted for a limited number of reasons:
(a) Dereliction of duty on the part of the Arbitration Committee or any of
its members; (b) The use of undue influence upon the Arbitration
92 See id. at 13.
93 See id. at 13-14.
94 See id. at 9.
95 See id. at 8. The credit consultant who advised the arbitration committee being
appealed may not serve on the Policy Review Board. See id.; see also YELDELL, supra
note 19, at 14-18.
96 See WGA MANUAL, supra note 44, at 8.
97 Id. at 8. See also YELDELL, supra note 19, at 14-18.
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Committee or any of its members; (c) The misinterpretation,
misapplication or violation of Guild policy; or (d) Important new written
material, for valid reasons not previously available to the Arbitration
Committee. 98
Following either the first arbitration award of credits, if there is no
appeal taken, or following an upheld post-appeal credit determination,
[t]he decision of the Guild arbitration committee, and any Board of
Review established by the Guild in connection therewith, with respect to
writing credits, insofar as it is rendered within the limitations
of... Schedule A, shall be final, and the [production] Company will
accept and follow the designation of screen credits contained in such
decision and all writers shall be bound thereby. 99
The WGA collective bargaining agreement further addresses the issue
of post-arbitration litigation:
No writer or Company shall be entitled to collect damages or shall be
entitled to injunctive relief as a result of any decision of the Committee
with regard to credits.... [By signing a contract incorporating the
contents of the collective bargaining agreement] any writer or Company
specifically waives all rights or claims against the Guild and/or its arbiters
or any of them under the laws of libel or slander or otherwise with regard
to proceedings before the Guild arbitration committee... all such rights
or claims are hereby specifically waived. 100
98 WGA MANUAL, supra note 44, at 8; see also YELDELL, supra note 19, at 14-
18.
99 WGA MANUAL, supra note 44, at 9 (quoting 1988 WGA AGREEMENT, supra
note 62, at 286).
100 Id.
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IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES
A. State Challenge: Ferguson v. Writers Guild of America, West,
Inc.l01
Following the success of the film Beverly Hills Cop starring actor Eddie
Murphy, Paramount Picture Corporation sought to produce a sequel
utilizing the same characters. 10 2 After rejecting the written efforts of other
writers hired for the project, 10 3 Paramount retained screenwriter Larry
Ferguson to draft the script for the motion picture's sequel, Beverly Hills
Cop 1 .104 Upon completion of the film, a credits arbitration was conducted
and the WGA determined that Ferguson should receive co-credit with
another screenwriter for the script itself, while story credit was awarded to
Eddie Murphy and Robert D. Wachs. 10 5 In response to this award of
credits, Ferguson requested that the matter be reviewed by the WGA Policy
Review Board on April 27, 1987, stating in a letter through his attorney
that "there was a misinterpretation, misapplication and/or violation of Guild
Policy" in two specific ways. 106 First, Ferguson contended that awarding
story credit to both Murphy and Wachs was impermissible, as they were
production executives and were unable to receive such credit based upon
their contributions and the relevant WGA Credits Manual provision
governing producers receiving writing credit. 107 Ferguson also asserted that
the other screenwriter awarded screenplay credit had failed to contribute
the requisite thirty-three percent required for such an award. 108 The Policy
Review Board rejected these contentions and upheld the credits
determination.10 9
Ferguson subsequently filed suit in the California Superior Court on
May 15, 1987, seeking a "peremptory writ of mandate requiring the
Writers Guild to set aside its credit determination and make a new
101 277 Cal. Rptr. 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
102 See Ferguson, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
103 See id. at 453-454.
104 See id. at 451.
105 See id.
106 Id. at 454-455.
107 See id.
108 See id. For a discussion of the percentages required for the "Screenplay by"
writing credit, see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
109 See Ferguson, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
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determination giving Ferguson sole screenplay credit and sole story
credit."'110 Included with his petition, Ferguson provided all screenplay and
story materials so that the court could ascertain credit allocation under
WGA standards. 111 On November 20, 1987, the court denied the petition
and thereafter denied a motion for reconsideration on December 22 of that
same year.112
Ferguson appealed, 113 again providing the court with the relevant
screenwriting material, seeking a judicial determination of credit in his
favor. 114 In the alternative, Ferguson requested the court to order that a
new credits determination be made by the WGA due to a number of alleged
procedural defects credited to the first arbitration. 115 Finally, Ferguson
claimed that the superior court had erroneously denied his requests to
depose the other screenwriter awarded shared screenplay credit and to
110 Id. at 451.
111 See id. at 453.
112 See id. at 451.
113 Interestingly, three days before oral argument was set to commence, Ferguson
sought to dismiss his appeal. However, the request to dismiss was denied by the court,
which noted that the "issues [involved] are both substantial and recurring" and that the
appeal had been pending for three years with Ferguson's dispute with the WGA still
unresolved. Id.
114 See id. at 453.
115 See id. at 453-454. Associate Justice Klein summarized Ferguson's alleged
seven defects:
(1) the Credit Arbitration Secretary improperly cast herself in the role of
consultant to the arbitration committee and had improper substantive
communications with the three arbitrators; (2) Ferguson was unfairly denied a
postponement of the arbitration to assemble additional story materials and prepare
his confidential statement for the arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators were given
insufficient time to review the materials Ferguson submitted; (4) the Writers Guild
took no steps to ensure the three arbitrators were disinterested and unbiased; (5)
the arbitrators were not provided with copies of Schedule A or the Credits Manual;
(6) the Writers Guild incorrectly treated as story material a memorandum in which
Paramount executive David Kirkpatrick recounted a story idea told to him orally
by Murphy and Wachs; and (7) the Writers Guild improperly denied Ferguson's
request that the arbitrators be given a second memorandum in which Paramount
executive Michael Roberts remarked that Paramount "threw out" the screenplay
drafted by the writers it has previously engaged and hired Ferguson "to write an
entirely new draft."
Id.
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compel discovery of the names of the three WGA arbiters, whom Ferguson
also apparently wished to depose. 116
The court affirmed the decision of the superior court, stating that
although a judge is arguably "as capable as any lay person" in determining
credits, it nonetheless agreed:
[W]ith the Writers Guild's position that under Schedule A and the Credits
Manual, disputes over writing credits for feature-length photoplays are
nonjusticiable.... [The WGA membership] have agreed among
themselves (by approving the Credits Manual) and with the producer's
association (by entering into Schedule A of the Basic Agreement) that this
delicate task is to be performed by arbitration committees composed of
experienced Writers Guild members. 117
These members, the court stated, could resolve credit disputes "both
more skillfully, more expeditiously, and more economically" than the
courts, avoiding the need to undertake "ruinously expensive litigation."118
Further, the scope of judicial review was held to be limited to
determining only whether the terms of the WGA Credits Manual had been
violated by a material and prejudicial breach from the approved
procedures. 119 Such restricted review, the court commented, echoed the
scope of judicial review given to more traditional forms of arbitration,
where courts have expressly declined to adjudicate the merits of an
arbitration award, instead focusing on (1) whether the parties had agreed to
arbitration, (2) whether the objecting party had a fair opportunity to be
heard under the arbitration procedures utilized and (3) whether the arbiters
exceeded their authority.120
Applying this limited scope of review, the court found no material
breach of the Credits Manual, citing "considerable deference" to the WGA
Policy Review Board's approval of the credit determination due to its
members' "expertise in the interpretation and application of Schedule A
and the Credits Manual. ' 121 The court also noted that because Ferguson
presented only two alleged breaches of proper procedure before the Board,
the screenwriter thereby failed to preserve for judicial review his seven








contended violations. 122 Such lack of preservation was derived from "the
familiar principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies [which] prevents
a litigant from pursuing a judicial remedy for procedural defects without
having first asked the private organization to correct them." 123 Even if
Ferguson had successfully preserved his contentions, however, the court
suggested in passing that the record failed to present sufficient convincing
support and that it would find the asserted claims to be without merit. 124
Finally, the court rejected Ferguson's claim that the identities of the
arbiters should have been disclosed, in addition to declining to accept
interrogation of the arbiters and the other screenwriter awarded co-credit
with Ferguson. The court expressed doubt that obtaining the other
screenwriter's appraisal of both his and Ferguson's contributions to the
script would reveal anything, because the writer had not offered to concede
credit in the prior WGA arbitration. 125 Disclosure of the identity of the
arbiters was similarly impermissible, the court reasoned, due to both the
Credits Manual's specific provision that the three arbiters remain
anonymous to one another, and to the Guild's long-standing policy-not
expressly stated in. the Manual-that no arbitration party or other Guild
member could learn the arbiters' identities. 126 Although the court noted the
122 See id. at 455. For the court's summation of Ferguson's claimed procedural
indiscretions, see supra note 115.
12 3 Id. at 454 (citing Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d
465, 474-477 (1976)).124 See id. at 455.
125 See id.
126 See id. at 455. The holding that the names of the arbiters should not be
disclosed contrasts with the earlier state court decision found in Writers Guild of
America, West, Inc. v. Superior Court, 245 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1988). Screenwriter Gore
Vidal challenged a WGA credit arbitration in which he was not awarded credit on the
motion picture The Sicilian. Dispute arose over the WGA's refusal to answer
interrogatories presented by Vidal seeking the identities of the arbiters. See id. at 828-
830. The trial court initially rejected Vidal's motion to compel disclosure, stating that,
while the court did not accept the WGA's position that federal law governed the issue,
the court nonetheless was not inclined "it]o permit one dissatisfied writer to attack a
system he has agreed to be bound by." Id. at 830.
Upon Vidal's motion for reconsideration, the trial court granted the motion to
compel discovery of the arbiters' identities after the court learned that the arbitration
rules governing this issue were not written, but were simply the custom that had been
followed. The court passed on answering the Guild's motion for reconsideration, stating
that it believed that the issue was one to be decided more properly by the court of
appeals. See id. The appellate court noted that the issue was "essentially 'a policy
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unusual nature of the WGA credits arbitration procedure, it nonetheless
upheld nondisclosure of the arbiters' identities and affirmed the lower
court, rejecting Ferguson's claims in providing state judicial vindication of
the controversial arbitration process. 127
B. Federal Challenge: Marino v. Writers Guild of America, East,
Inc.128
After co-writing a treatment for a second sequel to the motion picture
The Godfather, screenwriter Nick Marino was hired in 1985 by Paramount
Pictures Corporation to draft the subsequent screenplay for the film.
Ultimately, the script went unproduced by the studio. Two years later,
Marino completed a second treatment, which he then submitted to
Godfather director Francis Ford Coppola's production company; the
decision'" involving balancing Vidal's discovery interests against the arbiters'
confidentiality interests. See id. at 835. After acknowledging the difficulty in somehow
restricting the scope of disclosure, the court explained:
It is clear that what threatens the privacy interests of the arbitrators is not so much
disclosure to the general public as disclosure to those in the entertainment industry
who hire writers .... undoubtedly the arbitrators' names will become a matter of
public record .... When we balance the risk of harm to the arbitrators from public
disclosure, which harm at this point is somewhat speculative, with the very real
risk to Vidal that he will not be able to continue with his lawsuit, the scales tip in
favor of disclosure.
Id. Interestingly, Vidal's suit was settled, and on April 5, 1988, the WGA filed a notice
of settlement and sought to withdraw its appeal a week prior to the court of appeals
affirming the compelled disclosure. The court nevertheless rendered its decision on
April 12, 1988. See Recent Cases, ENT. L. REP., May 1988, at 3, 5.
127 See Ferguson, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 455. The court explained that:
While it is unusual to have an arbitration procedure in which the parties cannot
appear in person before the arbitrators and cannot learn the arbitrators' identities,
discovery of the names of the arbitrators in a Writers Guild credit arbitration could
serve no legitimate function. . . . Even when an arbitration is conducted under
more familiar rules, though . . .. the losing party is not permitted to conduct an
inquisition into the arbitrators' thought processes in reaching their award.
Id. (citing Cobler v. Stanley, Barber, Southard, Brown & Assocs., 217 Cal. App. 3d
518, 528-529 (1990)).
128 992 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 978 (1993).
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unsolicited text was not purchased. Coppola, along with writer Mario
Puzo, co-wrote a screenplay for the film in 1989-90, which was produced
as The Godfather 111.129
Upon completion of the film, Paramount submitted to the WGA and to
the writers involved with the project a list of tentative credits awarding
shared writing credit to both Coppola and Puzo. 130 As required in the
collective bargaining agreement, a WGA credits determination was
automatically conducted due to the proposed award of writing credit to
director and production executive Coppola.13' Although several writers
were involved in the project to varying degrees and submitted material to
the WGA arbitration committee, only three individuals sought recognition
of credit in the arbitration proceeding: Marino, Coppola and Puzo. 132
Following arbitration, only Coppola and Puzo received writing credit.
Marino contested the decision to the Policy Review Board, which
uncovered in its investigations that one of the three arbiters had not read
the original 1985 treatment which Marino had co-written. The arbiter was
sent the treatment and subsequently upheld the earlier credit determination.
Marino was informed that the credit determination was binding and that no
new Guild arbitration would be commenced. 133
Marino then filed suit against the Writers Guild to obtain vacatur of the
credit determination and to obtain declaratory relief.134 Both parties moved
for summary judgment. In granting summary judgment for the Writers
Guild, the district court explained that "[a]n arbitration award may be
vacated if a union breached its duty of fair representation in connection
with the arbitration proceeding ... or if the proceedings which culminated
in the award were not fundamentally fair. '' 135 Such fundamental fairness,
the court noted, entailed meeting three basic minimal requirements:
"adequate notice, a hearing on the evidence, and an impartial decision by
129 See Marino, 992 F.2d at 1482.
130 See Marino v. WGA, West, Inc., No. CV 91-110-WJR(SX), 1991 WL
519583, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 1991).
131 See id. at *2.
132 See Marino, 992 F.2d at 1482 n.2.
133 See id. at 1483.
134 Originally, suit was brought in California state court. The Writers Guild
successfully had the suit removed to federal court, asserting that the claim was governed
by the WGA Minimum Basic Agreement and preempted by federal labor law. See
Marino, 1991 WL 519583, at *3.
135 Id.
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the arbitrator. ' 136 Finding no evidence of arbitrary or discriminatory
conduct, nor of any denial of fundamental fairness, the court upheld the
arbitration. 137
On subsequent appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the
granting of summary judgment de novo, considering the numerous
allegations of impropriety Marino alleged.138 First, Marino challenged the
allowance of anonymity for the arbiters, alleging that such concealment of
identity also permitted possible concealment of bias, as well as a loss of
opportunity to testify in person or cross witnesses before the arbitration
committee. Further, Marino contended that he was denied the right to have
all of the writers involved in the dispute remain anonymous, that relevant
evidence was excluded from the proceedings, while improper evidence was
considered and that he was precluded from review of the other
screenwriters' submitted materials. 139
Extolling the virtues of arbitration, the court began its analysis noting
that "[a]rbitration is a favored method for the resolution of
disputes ... [and] because arbitration is contractual, rather than imposed
by law, what we have come to see as the hallmarks of judicial justice are
not necessarily required in arbitral justice." t40 A benefit of arbitration, the
court continued, is its ability to "supply high-powered expertise to a
particular and narrow area-such as deciding who should get credit for
creating an imaginative work" while potentially allowing the arbiters to
avoid the inherent pressures and biases placed upon them. 141 Undue judicial
interference, then, would only lessen the potential effectiveness which
arbitration could afford.
Approaching the issues with such judicial inclination, the court
explained that "it is well settled that a party may not sit idle through an
arbitration procedure and then collaterally attack that procedure on grounds
not raised before the arbitrators when the result turned out to be
adverse."1 42 This rule was regarded as applicable to objections concerning
the adequacy or type of arbitration procedures utilized, the fairness of the
136 Id.
137 See id. at *4.
138 See Marino, 992 F.2d at 1483 (citing Kruso v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872
F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 937 (1990)).
139 See Marino, 992 F.2d at 1483.
140 Id.
141 Id.




arbitration and the duty of fair representation a union owes to its members.
Citing Ferguson, the court, cognizant of the "important and legitimate"
considerations necessitating arbiter anonymity, 143 reviewed how reasonable
precautions had been taken to ferret out bias, given the unique
circumstances of the industry. 144 Likening Marino's arguments against
anonymity to claims of arbiter bias, the court adjudged the claims to be
waived due to Marino's failure to raise his contentions prior to the WGA
arbitration. While the court recognized the possibility of encountering a
system so per se unfair that no prior objections need be made prior to
seeking judicial resolution, and that not every procedural defect would
always be waived if a timely objection was not made, the court found the
instant matter to fall within the scope of waiver through lack of prior
objection. 145 Thus, Marino's claims concerning anonymity failed, including
his allegation of error that he has been prevented from learning the identity
of the arbiters during discovery. The court, repeating its finding of a
waiver, held the arbiters' identities irrelevant to Marino's case. 146
Similarly unsuccessful was Marino's allegation that the union had
violated its duty of fair representation. Applying a two-pronged test, the
court looked at (1) if the union's "misconduct" alleged by Marino involved
the union's judgment or was procedural in nature and (2) if the conduct was
held to be procedural in nature, whether the conduct was "arbitrary,
143 Id. (quoting Ferguson v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 277 Cal. Rptr.
450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)). Regarding the anonymity of the arbiters as "the heartland of
the arbitration procedure," id. at 1485, the appellate court recognized the inherent
balancing involved in expanding the openness of the arbitration procedure against the
practical considerations weighing upon the livelihoods of those willing to function as
arbitrators:
Very important people may be unhappy with a decision and may be in good
position to pressure or take revenge against the arbiters .... The heavy
responsibility of the arbiter's mantle might well be declined by hard-working
writers if they knew that they could be hauled through recriminatory judicial
proceedings, accused of bias, and the like.
Id. at 1484.
144 See Marino, 992 F.2d at 1484. Marino had made no previous formal objection
to the arbiter selection procedures and in fact had joined another writer in striking 85
individuals from the list of potential arbiters. The Guild arbitration coordinator had also
screened all potential arbiters for bias. See id.
145 See id. at 1483-1485.
146 See id. at 1488.
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discriminatory, or in bad faith." 147 If the court determined that the alleged
conduct fell under the union's exercise of judgment, Marino could only
prevail if the conduct was shown to be discriminatory or in bad faith, a
stricter standard than if the conduct were procedural in nature. 148 Noting
that arbitrary conduct against Marino could not be simply negligence, but
rather had to constitute a showing of reckless disregard for Marino's rights,
the court disposed of each claim Marino asserted as failing to comprise
such reckless conduct. 149
First, Marino attacked the entire arbitration procedure as fundamentally
unfair. The court felt that this was, in part, another assertion of the waived
anonymity issue, and that Marino's additional complaint of being prevented
from reviewing the statements of the other arbitration participants failed to
constitute fundamental unfairness. Given the time constraints involved, and
the fact that the statements of the writers were not regarded as substantive
evidence but only opinion, the court found no inherent unfairness, although
in passing it was noted that the confidentiality of the statements involved
was not wholly necessary, because replies to the statements could simply be
discouraged or altogether denied. 150 Marino also asserted that his request to
keep the identity of the writers involved anonymous was rejected by the
arbitration coordinator despite existing as a right under the terms of the
Credits Manual. This claimed procedural violation was presented to the
WGA Policy Review Board, which had concluded that no such demand had
been made; in fact, Marino included his name in his statement to the
arbitration committee. This exercise of judgment was held to be within
reason by the court, which stated that even if a factual dispute over the
demand existed, it did not indicate arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith
conduct by the union. 151
Marino further claimed that the committee's failure to consider his
1987 treatment was indicative of misconduct constituting a breach of fair
representation. However, the treatment was not purchased by a Guild
signatory, was not written while Marino was under employment to a Guild
147 Id. at 1486.
148 See id. (quoting Burkevich v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 894 F.2d 346, 349
(9th Cir. 1990)).
149 See Marino, 992 F.2d at 1486-1488.
150 See id. at 1486. During discovery, the court noted, Marino had obtained copies
of the other writers' statements and had failed to assert that they indicated any breach of
fair representation. See id.




signatory and was therefore adjudged by the Guild to be outside WGA
jurisdiction. This jurisdictional decision was neither shown to be a recent
alteration of the WGA's scope of jurisdiction nor proven to have been
made with the intention of damaging Marino's claim of credit. The decision
was not held to constitute a breach of duty.152 Finally, Marino argued that
the committee had not reviewed all material submitted to them, while
improperly reviewing material such as the previous films in the trilogy and
the novel which spawned the series. Both claims failed, as the court found
nothing constituting bad faith or discrimination in the WGA's acceptance of
the arbiters' focus, which emphasized some material to a greater extent
than other work. 153
In concluding, the court reflected on the unusual nature of the process
which the WGA had constructed after winning the right to determine
credits:
The need for speed is part of the right [the WGA] negotiated for on behalf
of its members. That need drives the whole process; in the absence of
quick determinations, it is likely that the right itself would whither away.
... Although the three-phase arbitration procedure is not the same as the
more deliberate judicial procedures that we are accustomed to, this case
helps show why it cannot be. 154
Noting that The Godfather III had been released over three years prior,
the court continued: "Our procedures require time; other needs demand
other procedures .... [in this case] we cannot say that the procedures
designed for speed overwhelmed the ideal of justice." 155
C. The Legacy of Ferguson and Marino
The impact of Ferguson and Marino is uncertain, despite the passage of
several years since their final dispositions. Certainly, Ferguson provides
state court recognition of the validity of the WGA credits arbitration
procedures, while Marino stands for similar recognition on the federal
152 See id. at 1487.
153 See id. The court noted that the Credits Manual provided for the review of
source material-the previous motion pictures and the novel-and that Marino had
included such references in his written statement to the arbiters. See id.
154 Marino, 992 F.2d at 1488.
155 Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
level. The resulting precedent may well have a chilling effect on
screenwriters' enthusiasm for challenging the arbitration procedures in the
forum of the court; this may perhaps be occurring on the federal level
already. 156 Beyond the film industry, the legacy of both cases is arguably
more theoretical than concrete. To date, few cases have cited Marino,
which itself is the sole case to have cited Ferguson. In English v.
Burlington Northern Railroad Co.,157 the court affirmed the Public Law
Board's upholding a railroad worker's discharge by the railroad for off-
duty misconduct. While discussing a possible claim against the union
representing the discharged employee, English, at the Board hearing, the
court cited Marino as standing for the proposition that in establishing a
breach of duty of fair representation, a union member must show arbitrary,
discriminatory or bad faith conduct on the part of the union toward the
member. 158 However, English had brought his claim against the Board,
thus relegating Marino to an extraneous aside. Similarly, in Babcock &
Wilcox Co. v. PMAC, Ltd.,159 the court disposed of a claim of arbiter bias
by citing Marino for support that a party cannot collaterally attack an
arbitration on grounds that the complaining party failed to raise before the
arbiter prior to the arbitration procedure. 160
Marino, however, has enjoyed some perhaps more significant attention
in theoretical circles. One commentator has routinely cited Marino as an
example of judicial acceptance of "even novel systems of arbitration,"
potentially opening the door for innovative, need-specific forms of
arbitration which would bar federal court litigation as part of a continuing
"revisionary interpretation of the scope of arbitration." 161 Another
commentator has suggested implementing a similar system of credit
allocation within the setting of academia. Such a system would enable
universities to determine proper credit allocation for faculty contributions to
156 See discussion infra note 200.
157 18 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 1994).
158 See Burlington, 18 F.3d at 745.
159 863 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App. 1993).
160 See Babcock & Wilcox, 863 S.W.2d at 232.
161 Joseph Z. Fleming, Analysis of Humanitarian Rights Laws Affecting Hours,
Wages, Working Environment in the Airline and Railroad Industries-Suggested
Procedures for Consolidating Dispute Resolution, SA31 ALI-ABA 927, 957-959
(1996); see also Joseph Z. Fleming, Grievances and Arbitration for the Organized
Employer, CA41 ALI-ABA 301, 338-339 (1995).
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composite works in which the university claimed ownership. 162 Other
possibilities exist; it is not unreasonable to imagine a similar system of
dispute resolution employed within the context of attorney-client disputes,
with bar associations providing attorneys willing to serve anonymously,
rendering decisions on fee disputes between parties whose identities are
concealed. 163 It is also realistic to explore implementing a similar system to
handle charges of false political campaign advertising, where fast resolution
of disputes would serve the social utility by ideally limiting public
consumption of misstatements which could affect election results. In such
cases, waiting until the court or other decisionmaking body can provide an
answer may result in eventual vindication, but would not provide
employment. Further, the need for anonymity may be derived from the
inherent discomfort the arbiters would face in rendering decisions
concerning public figures who may currently hold or subsequently attain
influential positions where retribution would be possible, however
unseemly.164 However, for the most part, the legacy of Ferguson, Marino
and the credits arbitration process remains unwritten, with the possible
implications from judicial endorsement of such a departure from the
traditional model of arbitration yet unknown.
V. THE CREDITS DETERMINATION PROCESS AND TRADITIONAL
ARBITRATION
The specialized nature of credits determination invariably leads to
dispute over both the arbitration procedures used in the WGA process and
in the rules defining types of credits used by the arbiters. Given the
inherent difficulty in measuring creative contributions through designated
percentages, the fact that disputes arise is unremarkable. Setting aside for
the moment issues concerning what the guidelines should be for quantifying
162 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act
of 1976, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 590, 640 n.178 (1987).
163 Many bar associations already offer fee dispute resolution programs patterned
after traditional arbitration.
164 See, e.g., In re Complaint Against Harper, 77 Ohio St. 3d 211 (1996). In
Harper, dispute arose over a campaign commercial aired in the 1994 Ohio Supreme
Court election. The eventual reprimand given to one of the parties for violating Canons
of the Code of Judicial Ethics was delivered two years after the actual election,
potentially risking a much-delayed, moot "victory" had the target of the advertisement
been defeated by the offending party.
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creative contributions, consideration must be paid to the methods employed
to implement these guidelines. The issue is whether the credits arbitration
process is not only effective in resolving disputes quickly, but effective as
well in meeting the theoretical basis underlying more traditional methods of
arbitration.
In the traditional model of arbitration, following a demand for
arbitration, the parties involved will work together to select an arbiter who
will then meet with the parties to establish the issues, determine discovery
limits and create an arbitration schedule. 165 The actual arbitration hearing
proceeds not unlike a trial; both sides will present their argument to the
arbiter with opportunity for cross-examination, and after closing arguments
the arbiter will render a decision after appropriate deliberation. 166
While such procedures at face value generally appear to mirror
litigation, there are notable differences. As compared to litigation,
arbitration offers parties a number of distinct powers and responsibilities:
First, [arbitration] is private.... Second, the parties select their own
decision-maker... . They also may employ a panel of arbitrators rather
than a single arbitrator.
Third, the parties ... can control such details as how arbitration will
be invoked, whether the arbitrator's award will be advisory or binding,
whether witnesses will be called and placed under oath, whether briefs
will be submitted, and whether the record will remain open after the
hearing for receipt of new evidence....
Fourth, arbitration gives the parties the option of selecting the
standards the arbitrator will use in resolving a dispute....
Finally, the parties pay all the costs associated with voluntary
arbitration, including the arbitrator's fee and any other expenses. The
taxpaying public bears none of the costs. 167
The putative advantages and disadvantages of arbitration have been
well documented, despite remaining relatively unmeasured. 168 Perhaps the
most commonly cited advantage is that arbitration provides resolution of
disputes more efficiently than courts can-defining efficiency here as
165 See MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF DIsPUTE RESOLUTION: ARBITRATION
AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 10 (1995).
166 See id.
16 7 SUsAN M. LEESON & BRYAN M. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DIsPuTE RESOLUTION
IN AMERiCA 47 (1988).
168 See 1 IAN R. MACNEiL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBrrRATION LAw § 3.1, at 3:3.
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constituting fast resolution with low financial outlay169-and in this respect,
the WGA arbitration system is not found wanting. Commentators generally
agree that arbitration is traditionally quicker at producing a decision as
compared to litigation, although such speed may be lost depending on
procedures and party conduct.170 The credits arbitration process is clearly
quick. From initial dispute to final determination of credits, the arbitration
may take no more than twenty-one business days. 171 In contrast, the
Marino court noted that three years had elapsed from the release of The
Godfather III to that court's consideration of the credit dispute. 172 Should a
film remain unreleased pending judicial disposition, such a lapse of time
would unquestionably pose serious problems to the principals involved in
the making of the film, with potentially disastrous consequences. 173
Further, in comparison to the monetary costs associated with prolonged
litigation, arbitration is regarded as generally less expensive. However,
under a traditional model of arbitration, financial outlays may quickly
accumulate as costs are contingent upon a variety of factors: the extent of
discovery allowed, the possibility of litigation over arbitrability or an
arbiter's award, the varying involvement of attorneys and compensation to
the arbiter or to the administering arbitration institution involved (or even
to both). 174 Again, the Guild procedures are relatively cost-effective for
participating writers due to the absence of several possibly resource-
draining elements: there is no discovery, the Guild assumes the cost of the
actual arbitration and the involvement of counsel is presumably minimal in
the typical credits arbitration.
169 See id. § 3.2.2, at 3:9-3:10.
170 See id. § 3.2.2.1, at 3:11-3:12.
171 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
173 See the discussion of the economic realities of the film industry, supra Part I.
174 See 1 MACNEL ET AL., supra note 168, § 3.2.2.2, at 3:12-3:13. Other costs
aside from financial expenditures exist. See id. at 3:12 n.34. In the context of
determining screenwriting credits, arbitration may arguably contribute in part to many
writers' sense of powerlessness. Perhaps "having one's day in court" would provide
many screenwriters with a sense that justice has been pursued more vigorously, given
the trappings of the judicial system, in contrast to the anonymous "hidden" work of the
WGA arbiters, where the stature of the arbiters is less symbolic than that of a judge,
given that the arbiter is another screenwriter not unlike the participating writers. Such
speculation, if correct, would increase the intangible costs the screenwriter pays through
arbitration.
255
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A second advantage derived from traditional arbitration is its inherent
privacy. While litigation proceedings "are generally open to anyone
wishing to walk into a courtroom or examine court records," traditional
arbitration models allow parties to "exclude strangers from the hearing and,
unless requested by either of them, neither records nor transcripts of the
hearings are maintained. Nor do arbitrators generally write opinions." 175
Guild arbitration provides participating writers a greater degree of privacy
than litigation, and, in some respects, grants further privacy than even
more traditional models of arbitration. In credits arbitration, there is no
face-to-face encounter with the arbiters. The identity of the participating
writers, the name of the script and the contents of the writers' arguments
are not revealed to anyone save the panel of arbiters and its consultant, and
identification of the authors and film may be withheld even from the
arbiters by special request.176
However, the privacy afforded the arbiters themselves may arguably
diminish accountability, thereby increasing the potential for ill-decided
credit allocations. Critics argue that true accountability for dereliction of
duty is lost due to arbiter anonymity; 177 concerns have been raised that,
while the arbiters are supposed to read all of the material submitted as part
of the arbitration, not all arbiters do. 178 Proponents of the credits
arbitration justify anonymity by pointing to the necessity to protect the
arbiters from retribution by displeased arbitration participants; there is the
risk that "[s]ince Hollywood is a town not known for its tenderness, few
writers would judge an arbitration without the guarantee of anonymity." 1 79
The courts have recognized this fact, and in both Ferguson and Marino the
element of possible retribution played a role in the courts upholding arbiter
175 Id. § 3:13.
176 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
177 See Robert W. Welkos, 'Cable,' 'Rock' in Disputes on Writing Credits, L.A.
TIMEs, May 21, 1996, Fl, at F6. One attorney representing a displeased screenwriter
described the arbitration system: "Very little is revealed in the process .... The names
of the arbitrators are not revealed. The final opinions of the arbitrators are not revealed.
The statements other writers supplied to the arbitrators are not revealed. Everything is
directed toward preventing accountability, scrutiny and review rather than the
contrary." Id.
178 See Cox & Johnson, supra note 31, at 14.
179 Eisele, supra note 58, at F3.
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anonymity. 180 Notably, the practice of arbiter anonymity was not included
in possible changes suggested in the Guild's 1995 referendum on the credits
arbitration process; rather, the proposed alterations focused on the
substantive rules designed to guide the arbiter's decisionmaking' 81-
perhaps indicating a general consensus that such anonymity, despite being
one of the more prominent departures from traditional arbitration models,
is nonetheless a necessity.' 8 2
Another advantage attributed to traditional arbitration models is that the
process "may offer a less hostile atmosphere for resolving disputes than
does litigation."1 83 The level of hostility is contingent upon a number of
variables, with possible explanations for decreased hostility arising from
"[t]he very fact that each party [had] chosen the method of resolving the
dispute, that each had a role in choosing their judge, the lesser formality of
arbitration, and perhaps even the privacy of the proceedings .... 184
The Guild procedure arguably fails to mirror the majority of these
components, instead presenting participants with a panel of unknown
arbiters and a relatively formal process in which the writers may feel
subject to the predilections and whims of individuals who remain beyond
any degree of substantial accountability. However, the greater privacy-
even secrecy-afforded the participants, the expedited length of the
resolution procedure and the lack of real interaction with opposing parties
may afford decreased hostility as compared to the level to be found in
litigation or even traditional arbitration models. Arbitration of any sort "is
essentially adversarial [in nature] .... The necessary factors for relative
harmony may ... be absent or have little effect, and it is unlikely that very
180 See supra notes 126-127, 143 and accompanying text. For the Vidal court,
however, the threat of retribution remained too speculative to warrant arbiter
anonymity. See supra note 126.
181 See Eisele, supra note 58, at F3. In 1995, the WGA membership voted on a
169-page compilation of revised screen and television credits manuals. The proposed
manuals, which would have enlarged the number of writers who could receive screen
credit, were rejected by the membership by a vote of 82% to 18%. See Ted Johnson,
WGA Vote Demands Credit Issue Rewrite, VARIETY, Nov. 6, 1995, at 7.
182 The need for anonymity to guard against retribution precludes consideration of
other alternative dispute resolution techniques involving face-to-face encounters, such as
mediation or med-arb. While a variation of either technique might be possible to
implement, perhaps using written communications between the parties and the arbiters,
such a system would in all probability be unwieldy and sacrifice the advantage of speed.
183 1 MACNEILET AL., supra note 168, § 3.2.4, at 3:14.
184 Id.
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many experienced arbitrators have not seen hostility in arbitration the full
equivalent of heated combat in the courtroom. '185
The mere possibility of decreased hostility remains an attractive feature
of traditional arbitration models, especially where parties do not desire to
alienate the opposing side. Indeed, "[w]here the relationship will or is
likely to continue during and following resolution of the particular dispute,
reducing hostility may become a major goal."1 86 This goal helps drive the
screenwriting credits determination process. Perhaps the most significant
contributions toward minimizing hostility that credits arbitration provides
are brevity and anonymity; protracted disputes can generate considerable
bitterness and cost, while the Guild procedure inherently provides fast
resolution and a convenient scapegoat in the panel of arbiters, to whom
negative feelings can be transferred safely without the capacity for actual
confrontation. As noted, the film industry is a relatively closely intertwined
business where personal relationships are of paramount importance and the
ability to emerge from disputes with little acrimony engendered is
invaluable. 187 The credit procedure's considerable strength, then, lies in its
emphasis on preserving relationships among all of the involved parties
while providing fast dispute resolution.
For at least one party, arbitration may also provide substantive and
tactical advantages. 188 Where there is an imbalance in power relations
between parties, the weaker side may benefit from arbitration; 189 such
opportunity may exist in the nontraditional Guild credits arbitration process
in the allowance for nondisclosure of the identities of participating writers.
Such nondisclosure arguably affords a less-powerful writer a greater degree
of equality in vying for credits against a more prominent writer. However,
as noted, in an industry in which high-profile assignments and projects are
rarely kept secret, there is the ongoing problem that the arbiters will have
knowledge of who worked on a film, and may even be able to detect a
screenwriter's distinctive style.190
Finally, another advantage of arbitration is that it offers the opportunity
for disputes to be heard by experts in a particular field; the rationale behind
this possible advantage is that "[a]n experienced arbitrator who is an expert
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
188 See 1 MACNEILET AL., supra note 168, § 3.2.5, at 3:15.
189 See id.




in the area of dispute may be more likely to decide the factual and legal
questions more fairly than a judge lacking such expertise. The arbitrator's
expertise, especially in technical fields... may often offer a great
advantage to both parties." 191 The courts have acknowledged this
supposition. 192 Supporting this theory is the notion that a screenwriter of at
least some level of accomplishment is a screenwriter capable of being a
good reader, able to effectively evaluate writing contributions. 193 No
known empirical data supports this writer-reader assertion, although the
rationale that a screenwriter would naturally be one of the more capable
arbiters with possibly the best understanding of what is involved in creating
a screenplay is arguably self-supporting. 194
Assuming then that the credits arbitration process provides the majority
of the essential strengths of arbitration, mention must be made of critical
evaluations of the rules employed within the procedures to guide the
arbiters in reaching a decision. As noted, there has been substantial debate
among the WGA membership over the number of writers who may receive
191 1 MACNEIL Er AL., supra note 168, § 3.2.6.2, at 3:17. However, some
concerns do exist over replacing neutral judges with experts:
Although an expert is more likely to introduce preconceived ideas and strong
professional opinions than would a judge of more general experience, party control
over selection may reduce such dangers, as may the use of neutral arbitrators on a
tripartite panel. Moreover, no systematic empirical evidence supports the
hypothesis that expert arbitrators are in fact more partial in decisionmaking than
are judges.
Id. (citation omitted). Under the WGA procedures, the arbiter selection process
arguably weakens a participating writer's ability to ferret out professionals with
potentially undesirable preconceptions. However, the three-member arbiter panel helps
offset this weakness.
192 See supra notes 117-118, 141 and accompanying text.
193 As previously noted, an arbiter must be a Guild member, meaning that he or
she has acknowledged script credits. Script credits are earned by being employed as a
writer, even if the written work has not been produced or the writer has not received
actual screen credit for his or her work. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
194 The fact that an expert or a panel of experts conducts the arbitration does not
necessarily mean that any greater degree of justice will be achieved. It has been noted
that, even limiting the definition of justice to process, the process adopted may, from a
larger public perspective, be viewed as unjust. Also, the use of experts sacrifices
"broader perspectives of generalists like judges and juries." 1 MACNEIL Er AL., supra
note 168, § 3.2.6.3, at 3:20.
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credit and what level of contribution of work they must meet. 195 The merits
of the requirements the WGA has chosen to use are beyond the scope of the
current discussion, although it should be noted that one of the rationales
behind choosing arbitration to resolve disputes is that parties are afforded
the opportunity to select the standards the arbiter shall apply. 196 In this
case, the Guild membership has voted to retain the current variety of
credits and their requirements. 197
The debate over what guidelines should be employed in determining
screen credits continues unabated, as does opposition to the Guild's non-
traditional arbitration process. Both areas are imperfect, but neither can be
held to wholly disregard the pursuit of justice in resolving credit disputes.
While nontraditional, the WGA system cannot be casually dismissed as
ineffective or unjust:
[A]rbitration cannot be divorced from the context within which it occurs.
The nature and role for arbitration depends, in part, upon the
characteristics of the system of social relationships in which it takes place.
Thus, the practice and effectiveness of arbitration in the trade or industry
from which the dispute arose will have influence on the effectiveness of
arbitration in disputes between parties from that trade or industry. 198
VI. CONCLUSION
The Writers Guild of America's credit arbitration process is a
potentially flawed mechanism in which the pursuit of fast resolution of
disputes and preservation of anonymity may at times lessen the degree of
justice achieved. Yet, the need for such speed is apparent and essential;
delay in releasing a film while credit deliberations wind their way through
the judicial process could prove disastrous. Film genres and stars fall in and
out of vogue; similar projects race to reach the screen the earliest, hoping
to capture the hearts, minds and wallets of the moviegoing audience first;
finances are finite, despite the contrary appearance Hollywood often
provides. Lengthy litigation could conceivably result in the failure of
studios and production companies, disrupt corporate plans, stall blossoming
careers and destroy other careers through retribution for turning to judicial
195 See Johnson, supra note 181, and accompanying text.
196 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
197 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
198 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 168, § 3.2.7, at 3:20-3:21 (citations omitted).
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resolutions. However, such desire for fast resolutions must not overwhelm
consideration of the substantial necessity for accurate credit determinations,
given the significance of credits. Preservation of the integrity of credit
entails quantifying a fundamentally abstract, inherently immeasurable
creative process; there is no system that could satisfactorily resolve such an
analytical paradox beyond a doubt. The WGA credits arbitration system is
one arguably born from necessity, then, designed to be as fair and accurate
as possible while retaining the significance of limited writing credits and
concurrently meeting the industry need for speed.
The need for anonymity is equally compelling. Preservation of
relationships is critical in an industry in which the adage "NOBODY
KNOWS ANYTHING" 199 contains an inherent truth, if overstated. Career-
oriented participants in a credits determination cannot risk creating
substantial ill-will. Careers blossom overnight, fortunes rise and fall and
today's opponent may be tomorrow's critical decisionmaker, who has the
power either to help the screenwriter's career flourish or to destroy it
completely.
The courts have recognized these needs. In both Ferguson and Marino,
the respective courts, confronted with a process embedded in the collective
bargaining agreement of the union representing screenwriters, deferred to
the right of the union members to collectively determine an aspect of their
professional and economic lives. Balancing the potential for imperfection
against a presumed probability of fairness, the courts have upheld the
arbitration process. The precedential value of such holdings has failed to
preclude all challenges to the arbitration process, as each new film season
will invariably be accompanied by new contentions of a failed system,
sometimes in the forum of the courts. 200 Further, the impact of this
199 GOLDMAN, supra note 4, at 39.
200 See, e.g., Guild Arbitrators, Zapped Over "The Cable Guy," Start "The Rock"
Quarrel, 7 WoRLD ARB. & MED. REP. 127 (1996); Welkos, supra note 177, at Fl.
Both films, released in the summer of 1996, resulted in the writers challenging the
WGA credits arbitration process. The Cable Guy challenge resulted in a lawsuit,
initially brought in state court, that was withdrawn after removal to federal court. The
Guild had threatened to seek monetary sanctions for "frivolous legal challenges" to the
credits arbitration process; the screenwriter bringing the claim may refile. See Writer
Pulls Plug on "Cable Guy" Suit, 7 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 152 (1996). In the case
of The Rock, screenwriter Jonathan Hensleigh was denied credit by the arbiters, despite
receiving support from both the film's producers and its director, the latter of whom
stated that "this result is a sham, a travesty .... No objective person could read Mr.
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relatively unusual system of ADR may extend beyond Hollywood 201 and
into other areas of creativity and commerce. As noted, the credits
arbitration process has been cited as a potential model for resolving credit
determination on composite works produced within the university
setting, 202 and at least one scholar has routinely held forth Marino as
indicative of judicial acceptance of novel arbitration methods barring
litigation through collective bargaining agreements, with implications
extending beyond the fields of entertainment, the arts and sports and into
similarly complex areas of commerce demanding quick resolutions to
disputes. 203
To be certain, such a system of anonymous arbiters that is devoid of
face-to-face encounters is not equally appealing to everyone, nor should it
have to be. Opponents may argue that justice is not served by such a
system, yet when adhering to more traditional methods of dispute resolution
would result in the needless collapse of a business enterprise or essentially
moot victories, the justice achieved would arguably be pyrrhic. If the
demands of an industry or situation require both speed and anonymity,
consideration of a need-specific procedure similar to the WGA credits
arbitration process should be undertaken as a potentially viable alternative
to both protracted litigation and more traditional models of arbitration.204
Hensleigh's shooting draft, compare it to the previous writers' drafts and come to this
conclusion." Welkos, supra note 177, at F6.
201 The use of arbitration systems modeled after the WGA process may become
more pervasive in Hollywood. The newly formed Producers Credit Board has stated
that it will seek to establish arbitration panels to help resolve disputes over producing
credits. See Bernard Weinraub, Movie Producers Want Only Credit Due, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), June 27, 1997, at 4E.
202 See Dreyfuss, supra note 162, at 640 n.178.
203 See supra note 161.
204 One treatise in its discussion of arbitration in general noted:
As [then] Judge Ginsburg has put it, the legislative policy favoring arbitration "is
at its strongest where the arbitration will be governed by procedures specifically
tailored to the context from which the agreement to arbitrate arises, and will be
conducted by arbitrators who are expert in the norms and practices of the relevant
industry."
1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 168, § 3.2.7, at 3:21 (quoting Pearce v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc., 828 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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